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PRELIMINARY MEl-10RANDUM

October 31, 1980 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 80-5303

Cert to CA9 (Wright, Anderson
and Solomon [DJ])

ANTONIA BELTRAN ET AL
v

BEVERLEE MYERS (DIRECTOR,
CALIFORNIA DEPARTt1ENT
OF HEALTH) ET AL
SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

· Timely

This class action challenges the validity under

federal law of California's "transfer-of-assets" rule governing
eligibility fot l-tedi.-Cal benefits.

It is str!foght-lined with

Barbara Blum v Ethel Caldwell, 179-2034, which involves the New
York "tranofet-of-asceta" rule.
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FACTS: Title XIX of the Social Security Act established
the Medicaid program, a cooperative federal-state program to
provide medical assistance to certain classes of people who are
in need of assistance. Though the states are not required to
participate, if they choose to do so they must develop a plan
that conforms to federal guidelines.

Despite extensive federal

standards, 42 u.s.c. S 1396a, the individual states are given
wide discretion in the administration of local programs.

The

states may decide whether or not to aid all ' "medically needy"
individuals.

But participating states

~

provide assistance

to •categorically needy" individuals -- that is, persons now
receiving (or eligible to receive) certain enumerated kinds of
assistance (such as AFDC).
Tbe chief distinction between the •medically needy" and the
•categorically needy• categories is that persons in the latter
category have generally lower incomes.

This is not to say that

aa.e states do not build an economic factor into the standards
for determing who is •medically needy.•

California, for one,

li•its the assets owned by a medically needy individual.

As

part of this scheme, the legislature adopted the "transfer of
asaeta• (TOA) rule.

This rule can operate to prevent a person

fro. qualifying aa •medically needy• if, in order to qual·ify
for aid under tbe relevant financial eligibility rules, he baa
tranaferred ••••t• for

1••• than fair con•l4erat1oo wltbln tbe

t.o rear• prior to bl• application.

ub

tbe toA~ex..pt• ~• a•.. t• froa tbe llaltatlon • b~• aDI
'
iaoo.e-producint real property, for
ex..ple. lut 'blt •

-
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property remains subject to a recovery provision.

v

That is,

after the person dies, California may recover the cost of aid
provided from the estate (including exempt assets).
What makes the TOA rule especially interesting is that
under federal law a person remains eligible for SSI payments
even if he has become eligible by transferring assets to others

!for less than adequate consideration.

Thus, California must

allow transfers by the "categorically needy," but it does not
allow transfers by the "medically needy."
The petitioners in this class action were "medically needy"
and otherwise eligible for benefits, but were denied benefits
because they had transferred assets for less than fair value
prior to applying for aid.

They were not able to overcome the

wrebuttable" presumption the TOA erects in such cases.

They

sought declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating and/or
enjoining the use of the TOA rule.

The district court granted

a motion for summary judgment in favor of California.

It also

entered findings of fact that the TOA rule did not conflict with
federal regulations.
HOLDING BELOW:

/

While recognizing that "the majority of the

courts which have been faced with similar challenges have
reached the opposite conclusion," CA9 upheld California's TOA
rule.
The court began by asking whether the California rule was
consistent with federal law.

42 U.S.C. S 1396a (a) (10) (C), as

·administratively interpreted, permits the transfer of assets
for less than adequate consideration in order to become eligible

for SSI benefits.

But the provisions defining the •medically

needy• do not extend all of the SSI eligibility requirements to
the •medically needy" classification.

If they did, there would

be no difference between the two classifications, •medically
needy• and •categorically needy.•

Insofar as the statute

requires analogous standards for the two classifications (as it
does), it requires

comparable,~

identical, factors.

This

means only that there must be enough similar characteristics or
qualities to make comparison appropriate.

California's rules

aeet that teat.
The court next turned to 42

u.s.c. S

1396a (a) (17) (B), which

requires that, in determining eligibility, states only consider
inca.e and resources which are •available• to the applicant.

CA

refused to take an •overly rigid and literal• reading of the
word •available.•

The court emphasized the ovecall approach of

the statute's eligibility provisions was one of flexiblity.

The

California rule presumes that the asset is •available• in some
way to the applicant, even after he baa given it away.

That is

not an unreasonable approach.
!b1e brought the court to 42 C.F.R.

tbat '

•"~• ~

s

435.401, which says

not uae criteria for deteralning eli9lbilty in

"~,.~c~l;lr Aeed • Gl•••lf~c~101l

...~

ac• .ore stringent

- s •

t

au . . th

r~ulatlon

co..s ln the

ulr ... nta• aectl n of the rules, not ln
tl

dealing with financial factors.

tu~ned

the

~--~

e

sed

only a rebuttable preau.ptlon, and

ana.~

table

constitutional challen9ea to the

CODg~eaa,

the Due Process Clause.

And, it

after all, differentiated between

aaslficatloas , and hence it ia acceptable under the
- · - Pro~!

Claaae.

!;!!!!!~~!!!=

fte petl tloner reiterates t:he arga~~ents

e

notes that states cannot penalize otherwise

.-de before CAJ.

eligible SSI applu:ants for tranaferriDCJ assets.

'1'0 per•it thea

peeaJ iae tbase tlbo are otherwise •.e«Jical.ly neec1y• la to

ra-tzab! tbe statab!, becaaae tbe statute iacJicat:es that: a
state -.y

~ ~Y

to tbe -.edically DeecJy•

CE lt:eria

.ore

aac:.ae used to judge t:be •categcK lcally needy. •
fte c.1y psatsslble dlffereace beble• the two categories l s
tile J,elter Is jllllged by .ore liberal reaouce CODC1itlOilS.

Be

El

f ~ dille

rea.a1

ageDCJ'

bas l.Dforaea state lledicaid

~Jat:ICIIWtip

beweea t1ae -.aUcaJJy aeecJy•
ta~•·

atat:ell 1110t apply
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Pinally, the petitioner reasserts -M1!r Equal Protection
arguaent by saying that the TOA rule irrationally differentiates
between the •medically needy• and the •categorically needy.•
~e

respondent claims that the TOA rule is not designed to

penalize individuals, but rather to preserve state funds for the
truly needy.

This comports with the purpose of the federal law

and with the decisions of this Court.

statutes or regulations exist.

No contrary federal

There is no prohibition of TOA

rules in Title XIX, and the only reasonable reading of that
statute would allow different treatment of the two categories
of recipients.

Since the courts should not presume that the

Congress intended to preempt the exercise of a valid state power
unless the Congress bas clearly and unambiguously expressed that
intent, the courts should not circumscribe California's exercise

of power here.
On

CAt

all other issues, tbe respondent tracks the opinion of

in tbis case.
DISCDSSIOlla

'l'bere is a stark conflict among the circuits

as to the interpretation of this
Y

statute.

Caldwell

Bla!, •21 F2d 491 (CA2)J Pabula v Buck, 598 P24 869 (CA4).

,_~
..

~portant

ce.. ba8 been
#

et~aight-lined

v 911...11, 179-2031

a l:h&l

,u.._

witb CA2'a opinion on the

lbla la the

...-~lo~

caae
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persuasive.

~A9 properly found that the presumption created was

rebuttable and that the differentiation was built into the

statute itself.
I

reco~~end a grant on the statutory question.

1 would not

grant on the petitioner's second question .
There is a response.

9/ 9/ 80

a

Sexton

Opinion in Petition

